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Taiwan’s identity struggles since the late 1980s havearisen out of a self-styled “nativist” reaction againstthe preceding decades of Chinese nationalist propa-
ganda under the Kuomintang (KMT), whose ideology was
promoted through various organs of state cultural policy.
This reaction began under the rule of the KMT itself, gath-
ering momentum during the presidency of Lee Teng-hui in
the 1990s, when cultural “indigenisation” (bentuhua) be-
came integral to a broader strategy for bolstering KMT legit-
imacy during Taiwan’s transition to democracy. The Demo-
cratic Progressive Party (DPP) regime between 2000 and
2008 sought to deploy many of the institutions inherited
from the old KMT state—in both the educational and cul-
tural sectors—for the promotion of strong messages concern-
ing Taiwan’s historical and cultural distinctiveness from
China. Museums were given a prominent role in the scheme
for “building up the nation on the basis of culture” (wenhua
li guo). As had Lee Teng-hui’s regime, the DPP administra-
tion of Chen Shui-bian saw the construction of a distinctive
sense of Taiwanese identity—to be popularised at home and
promoted abroad—as central to its cultural policy. (2)
This article builds on previous work on the portrayal of national
identity in museums before and during the period of DPP
rule, (3) and asks what the return to power in 2008 of the KMT
has meant for Taiwan’s museums. During October 2009, the au-
thor visited four of the major state-run museums most intimately
associated with the portrayal of the island’s cultural and histori-
cal identity, interviewed senior staff, and collected information on
recent and current exhibitions. On the basis of the data collected
then and during previous trips in 2004 and 2005, (4) this paper
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Museums in Taiwan—as elsewhere—have always been embroiled in politicised debates over collective identity, both
reflecting and helping to shape the contours of identity discourse. During the four decades of the Martial Law era, the
Kuomintang (KMT) regime used museums as vehicles for its campaigns to nurture patriotic citizens of a “Republic of
China” encompassing the entire Chinese mainland. However, with the onset of democratisation from the late 1980s,
museums increasingly reflected and reinforced a strengthening consensus over Taiwan’s historical and cultural
distinctiveness, while also mirroring the considerable pluralism of popular identity consciousness. This trend was
accentuated under the regime of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) after 2000, but 2008 witnessed the return to
power of a KMT determined to establish warmer ties with China. This paper examines the extent to which the new
regime’s more accommodative approach to China has extended into the realm of museums, while considering
whether developments within the sector, and within broader Taiwanese society, mean that museums are no longer
quite the pliable tools of official cultural policy that they once were.
History, Identity, and the Politics of Taiwan’s Museums
seeks to locate contemporary developments in the museums
sector in the broader context of recent works on culture and
identity on the island. It offers a necessarily tentative analy-
sis of what the latest change in regime has meant for the rep-
resentation of Taiwan’s own identity and history, of its rela-
tionship with China, of aboriginal history and culture, and of
ethnic pluralism more broadly. There is also some discussion
of the recent revival of cross-Strait “museum diplomacy” and
its implications for the portrayal of Taiwan to mainland Chi-
nese, and of China to the people of Taiwan. The paper con-
cludes by considering whether Taiwan is witnessing a return
to what Chang has termed the “schizophrenia” of KMT cul-
tural policy during the 1990s, (5) and—to the extent that it is—
what this may mean for Taiwanese society and for the all-im-
portant relationship with China.History ,  ideo logy,  and ident ity
Taiwan has been aptly termed a “laboratory of identities” by
Stephane Corcuff, (6) and scholars interested in the culture
and politics of identity have duly flocked there to observe
and research. Amongst the key issues that exercise observers
of the island’s identity politics are the relationship between
elite attempts to mould identity, and popular receptiveness or
resistance to such efforts. Museums in most societies (not
just Taiwan) can be seen as institutionalising what Stevan
Harrell terms “narratives of unfolding”—portrayals of na-
tional or ethnic identity as eternally fixed and clearly defined
by selecting from available historical evidence to convey the
sense of “an inevitable unfolding of [national/ethnic] des-
tiny from the primordial past.” (7) These narratives thus “ac-
tively hide the fluidity and changeability of identity and
group membership.” (8) However, though elites deploy such
narratives in attempting to manipulate popular conscious-
ness, this does not imply a view of identity formation as sim-
ply a top-down process. The readiness of a populace to in-
ternalise such narratives, Brown argues, depends on the ex-
tent to which they resonate with people’s lived experience.
Thus, where a “narrative of unfolding” conspicuously fails to
tally with family lore, social memory, or individual experi-
ence, people may simply reject it. This seems to have been
the case with the narrative of Taiwan’s place in China relent-
lessly touted by the KMT prior to the 1990s, and still pro-
moted by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to this day
(though Beijing’s Taiwan propaganda is directed primarily at
a mainland constituency with whom it does resonate).
However, if this portrayal of Taiwan as merely an island out-
post of a mainland-centred Chinese state sank relatively shal-
low roots in popular consciousness, Brown argues that long-
established assumptions concerning Han culture appear to
have had a far deeper impact on the conceptualisation of his-
tory and identity. She notes that “although people in Taiwan
distance themselves from Chinese national identity, they
often do so from within a Han cultural perspective.” (9) This
is revealed, she claims, in the way in which attempts to nar-
rate a distinctive island story for Taiwan “accept the assump-
tions that borders to Han and Chinese identities are clearly
defined and that these identities are inextricably linked to
each other.” (10) Han identity is typically construed in two
contradictory ways: on the one hand, myths associated with
the Confucian civilising mission hold that Chinese identity
can be acquired through the adoption of Chinese (i.e. Han)
culture; but on the other hand, social practices reinforced by
the highly patriarchal Confucian ethical code have deeply
entrenched the assumption that Han identity is inextricably
associated with Han ancestry (passed down the male
line). (11)
Previous research on cultural and educational policy has
shown how attempts to construct a Taiwanese identity in
such a way as to delegitimise Chinese sovereignty have often
implicitly accepted a correspondence between “Han” ethnic-
ity and political “Chineseness.” (12) This in part explains the
emphasis that has been placed by many advocates of Tai-
wanese independence on the significance of the island’s
(non-Han) aboriginal heritage, and the extent to which
many Taiwanese can claim mixed Han-aboriginal ancestry.
It has also contributed to a heightened interest since the
1990s in the influence of Japanese, Dutch, and any other
non-Chinese actors on the development of Taiwanese cul-
ture and identity. 
Meanwhile, there have also been attempts to articulate a vi-
sion of Taiwan simply as a community of all the island’s in-
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5. Chang, “Constructing the Motherland,” op. cit., p. 199.
6. See S. Corcuff (ed.),  Memories of the Future, op. cit., “Introduction.”
7. Melissa Brown, Is Taiwan Chinese? The Impact of Culture, Power and Migration on
Changing Identities, Berkeley, University of California Press, 2004, p. 6.
8. Stevan Harrell, “Introduction,” in Melissa Brown (ed.), Negotiating Ethnicities in China
and Taiwan, Berkeley, Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1996, pp.
1-18, p. 5—cited in Brown, Is Taiwan Chinese?, op. cit., p. 5.
9. Brown, Is Taiwan Chinese?, op. cit., p. 27.
10. Ibid.
11. See, for example, Brown, Is Taiwan Chinese?, op. cit., and David Faure and Tao Tao Liu,
Unity and Diversity: Local Cultures and Identities in China, Hong Kong, Hong Kong
University Press, 1996.
12. See Vickers, “Rewriting Museums in Taiwan,” and “Frontiers of Memory,” op. cit. On
education, see also Mei-Hui Liu, Li-Ching Hung and Edward Vickers, “Identity Issues in
Taiwan’s History Curriculum,” in Edward Vickers and Alisa Jones (ed.), History Education
and National Identity in East Asia, New York, Routledge, 2005, pp. 101-131.
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habitants—as with Lee Teng-hui’s “New Taiwanese” dis-
course of the late 1990s. This view seeks to promulgate the
idea that Taiwan, like the United States, can assert a right
to determine its own separate destiny on the basis of shared
principles and experiences. This vision competes with two
more totalising ones: the old KMT (and current Chinese
Communist Party (CCP)) view of Taiwan as culturally, eth-
nically, and historically inseparable from the Chinese “moth-
erland”; and a mirror-image of the latter constructed by some
advocates of Taiwanese independence, emphasising the pri-
mordial roots and manifest destiny of a “multicultural,” non-
Han, but nonetheless essentialised “Taiwaneseness.” As
one senior figure in the cultural bureaucracy under the first
Chen administration put it in 2005, referring to some of his
erstwhile colleagues, “they take the word Zhongguo [from
the old KMT narratives], and replace it with the word Tai-
wan.” (13) However, this comment in itself stands as testament
to a growing sophistication in public debate over the repre-
sentation of Taiwanese identity; elsewhere in East Asia,
such questioning of established pseudo-biological discourses
of national identity is still systematically marginalised. (14)
Museums offer just one window onto the development of
identity discourse in contemporary Taiwan and, given the way
in which museums in the Republic of China (ROC) are run,
this is primarily a window into the official or governmental
landscape (at least in the case of the major museums consid-
ered here). However, no neat division between official and
popular discourses can be posited, especially in a society as
open and democratic as Taiwan has become. The very close-
ness of museums to government, their inescapable involve-
ment in representing identities, and the extreme sensitivity of
press and public to portrayals of identity all mean that those
responsible for museums are compelled to engage with the
politics of identity whether or not they see this as a legitimate
aspect of their role. This does not mean that museum direc-
tors have no autonomy vis-à-vis the government, but it means
that they must negotiate a path between the cultural agenda
of their political masters and the various agendas of the media
to whose scrutiny their every move may be subjected.
The official cultural agenda thus remains hugely important
in conditioning the way in which museums operate and the
kinds of messages about identity that they convey. This arti-
cle will later consider the extent to which the KMT now of-
fers its own coherent “narrative of unfolding” through muse-
ums and cultural policy in the way that it did during the Mar-
tial Law era, or as the DPP attempted to do prior to 2008.
At the same time, consideration will also be given to the
question of whether, as viewed through the island’s muse-
ums, identity discourse in Taiwan may be starting to tran-
scend issues of ancestry and culture (conceived in rigid
terms), and embracing more fully the significance of lived so-
cial experience and the diversity of narratives of the past for
which this can form the basis. Linked to this issue is the
question of the extent to which gains made during the post-
Martial Law era in raising the professionalism and autonomy
of the museums sector are rendering that sector less suscep-
tible to political manipulation than it was in the past.Museums and pol it i cs  in  contemporary  Taiwan—an overv iew
Major publicly-funded museums in many countries are
treated as organs of the state, and often attract intense polit-
ical controversies—even when, as in many democracies, their
administrative arrangements place them at one remove from
direct governmental control. In Taiwan, however, the main
national museums are not just publicly-funded institutions—
they are also directly state-administered. There are no
boards of trustees charged with overseeing their manage-
ment while defending their autonomy against attempts at di-
rect political interference; museum directors are appointed
by and directly accountable to government ministries. This
reflects the importance attached by the KMT, from its in-
ception on the mainland, to cultural policy in general, and
museums in particular, as instruments for imposing a state-
centred vision of “Chineseness”—a mission that was fer-
vently visited upon Taiwan’s recalcitrant population from the
1940s. The fact that this administrative structure has not
been significantly altered since the advent of democratisa-
tion partly reflects the fact that elites critical of the old Chi-
nese nationalist orthodoxy have found it expedient to re-de-
ploy the highly centralised machinery of cultural policy for
the purposes of promulgating a very different sort of identity
discourse. Proposals to strengthen the formal autonomy of
the directors of public museums—for example by instituting
fixed-term appointments—have so far come to nothing. (15)
The hierarchical and centralised nature of the museums sec-
tor is illustrated by the details of a scheme introduced recently
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13. Quoted in Vickers, “Rewriting Museums in Taiwan,” op. cit., p. 96.
14. See Mitter and Jager (eds.), Ruptured Histories, op. cit., and, on the origins and history
of these identity discourses, Frank Dikotter (ed.), The Construction of Racial Identity in
China and Japan, Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press, 1997.
15. This proposal was made by Wu Mi-cha. See Wu Mi-cha, Jianli yi zuo guojia lishi
bowuguan (“Constructing a Museum of National History”), in Frank Muyard, Liang-Kai
Chou, and Serge Dreyer (eds.), Objects, Heritage and Cultural Identity, Nantou, Taiwan
Historica, 2009, pp. 285-292.
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History, Identity, and the Politics of Taiwan’s Museums
by the new KMT regime (but already under discussion prior
to 2008) to rank or grade the island’s major museums. The
main government-funded museums have been assigned levels
in a four-tier hierarchy, the top grade of which is oddly va-
cant. The National Palace Museum (NPM) alone is desig-
nated “Grade Two,” the National Museum of History
(NMH—along with a handful of others) is “Grade Three,”
and all other national-level museums are “Grade Four.”
Other museums—such those administered at county level—do
not even figure in this four-grade hierarchy. These “grades”
are designed to help rationalise a long-established system of
differentiated administrative arrangements: (16) the NPM is re-
sponsible directly to the Executive Yuan (the President’s cab-
inet), of which its Director is a member; the NMH answers
to the Ministry of Education; and the National Taiwan Mu-
seum (NTM) and National Museum of Taiwan History
(NMTH) are administered by the Council of Cultural Af-
fairs (CCA), which also plays a role in overseeing “lower”-
level institutions. Recruitment to the museums service, mean-
while, is governed by examinations that prioritise specialist
academic knowledge (in anthropology, archaeology, history,
or sub-disciplines thereof). (17)
This combination of a highly academic orientation with a
long-established system of close state regulation has created
a museums sector that is highly susceptible to political direc-
tion but run by a cadre of senior curators encouraged to see
themselves as detached and disinterested academic special-
ists. At a 2006 symposium in Taipei, a paper delivered by
the present author that highlighted the influence of politics
on the running of state museums was greeted with a furious
rebuttal by the recently-retired director of a “Grade Three”
museum. Such emphatic denials of politicisation appear
common, at least amongst those who began their careers in
the sector during the Martial Law era. All three museum di-
rectors interviewed for this study asserted that politics had
little or nothing to do with the running of their museums—in-
sisting instead on a “professional” ethos, or emphasising that
the cultural mission of museums rendered them apart from
the grubby mundane world of politicians. (18)
Such a stance is perhaps hardly surprising: exalted scholarly
status was the reward for service in the museum bureau-
cracy of the KMT era, and academic detachment a ration-
ale for declining to challenge the reigning cultural ortho-
doxy, or even to recognise that there was any orthodoxy to
challenge. At the same time, museum professionals in Tai-
wan have increasingly strong connections to their counter-
parts in Western countries, where museums often enjoy
stronger autonomy vis-à-vis the state, and they are under-
standably sensitive to any perception that their relative lack
of autonomy implies a lesser respect for their scholarly or
professional credentials. 
Such claims to “scientific” credentials, and a corresponding
detachment from the world of “politics,” can thus be seen as
serving two functions, depending on the political or profes-
sional concerns of the person making the claim. For many,
the paramount concern is no doubt a wish to be left alone to
get on with the work of conservation, research, and display,
and an irritation with the way in which politics complicates
these tasks—as it inevitably does in museums everywhere,
but more acutely in a society such as Taiwan emerging from
decades during which cultural institutions were the ideologi-
cal instruments of dictatorship. Allied to this is a perception
that embroilment in political controversy may sully the repu-
tation and lower the perceived status of museum profession-
als. However, the expression of such concerns sometimes
also cloaks a desire to wrap an orthodox but nonetheless in-
tensely ideological narrative of Taiwanese history and iden-
tity in the mantle of “scientific” respectability. 
As we shall see, this tactic has been used since 2008 in at-
tempts to discredit the policies previously pursued within the
museums sector by the DPP. The attempt to roll back ele-
ments of the DPP’s programme is justified with reference to
a “back to basics” drive within key museums, especially the
NPM, while earlier initiatives are portrayed as irresponsible,
politically-inspired adventurism. Whether this tactic is per-
suasive is another matter—the political nature of the KMT’s
post-2008 cultural agenda is fairly plain. Current attempts to
resurrect the old China-oriented orthodoxy under the ban-
ner of “scientific” objectivity also contrast tellingly with the
approach of some of those associated most closely with the
DPP’s drive between 2000 and 2008 to “Taiwanise” cul-
tural policy, who frequently made no bones about the politi-
95N o  2 0 1 0 / 3
16. According to Mr. Wei Chen Yu of the NTM, the introduction of this four-tier structure was
widely seen as a preliminary step towards a rationalisation of the entire sector, which
many felt had expanded too rapidly in recent years, to a point at which Taiwan simply
has too many publicly-funded museums.
17. Leading the Director of the NPM to complain in 2008 that “current regulations do not
allow us to hire all of the specialized staff that we need” (for example, those with infor-
mation technology or advertising expertise). (Chou Kung-shin, New Life, New Value: The
Brand New National Palace Museum, Taipei, National Palace Museum, 2008, p. 19)
18. Thus the Directors of the NMH and NPM both expressed faith in the viability of a depoliti-
cised relationship with mainland cultural institutions. The latter in particular sought to
distance herself from the “politicisation” of the work of the NPM under her DPP-appoint-
ed predecessors (that, amongst other things, had prevented collaboration with mainland
museums). Director Lu of the NMTH stressed his identity as a museum professional, not
a political person—though he acknowledged that the creation of his museum had been
widely “politicised” in the media. He cited his stock response to media queries: “I am a
museum person, I’m an anthropologist, and the complications that you refer to are all in
your own heads. To me, this job is extremely simple. It’s all about the history of the land
of Taiwan and the people living here.” (Lishi shi Taiwan zhe pian tudi he renmin de lishi.)
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cal aims of their project. (19) However, while the museums
sector has thus become something of a battleground for rival
political visions of Taiwan’s history and identity, growing pro-
fessionalisation within the sector, and increasingly intense
and sophisticated public and media scrutiny outside it, make
the blanket imposition, or re-imposition, of any orthodoxy a
highly fraught enterprise.Museums and identity  poli t ic sbefore 2008
The National  Palace  Museum
Epitomising the DPP critique of the institutionalisation of
Chinese nationalism on Taiwan under decades of KMT rule,
Tu Cheng-sheng, Director of the NPM from 2000 to 2004
(and subsequently Education Minister), in a 2004 interview
described that institution as a “political symbol” and as
“China’s thing” (Zhongguo de dongxi). Just like the Kuom-
intang, he commented, “it came from outside to rule Tai-
wan.” He represented his reforms (which included a pro-
posal, never implemented, to abolish the NPM Director’s
membership of the Executive Yuan) as an attempt to compel
the NPM to draw closer to (zouru) Taiwanese society, rather
than positioning itself simply as a shrine to the civilisation of
the lost Chinese motherland. A centrepiece of the NPM’s
permanent exhibition, removed during the museum’s latest
refurbishment, was an account of the heroic efforts of the
KMT, during the wars of the 1930s and 1940s, to save these
treasures for the Chinese nation. In the early years following
its reopening on Taiwanese soil in 1965, the NPM had also
played a prominent role in the KMT’s “Chinese Culture
Restoration Movement” (Zhonghua wenhua fuxing yun-
dong)—the Nationalist riposte to Mao’s Cultural Revolution. 
Director Tu and his successor strove to reorient the NPM
both towards Taiwan and towards “Asia” in general rather
than China in particular. (20) Whereas the NPM had previ-
ously confined itself almost entirely to China-themed exhibi-
tions, under Tu temporary exhibitions were staged focusing
on the “multicultural” elements of Taiwan’s early modern
history. The controversial plans for a “Southern Branch” of
the NPM (of which more below), to be devoted to exhibit-
ing “Asian culture,” were also central to this re-orientation
strategy. Both the emphasis on the “multicultural” character
of Taiwanese history and identity, and the positioning of Tai-
wan, culturally and geopolitically, within an “Asian” rather
than exclusively “Chinese” sphere, were central planks of
DPP cultural policy. 
The National  Museum of  History
Although the NPM is by far the most prominent and presti-
gious museum in Taiwan, the first major museum established
there by the KMT was the National Museum of History,
whose collection was also largely derived from a mainland in-
stitution—the Henan Provincial Museum. Unlike the NPM,
the NMH was designated a “comprehensive” (zonghe) mu-
seum in the tradition of Republican China’s provincial mu-
seums, with a remit encompassing history, natural history,
ethnography, anthropology, and fine art. However, its collec-
tion was far less dazzling and extensive than that of the
NPM, as were its premises and exhibition space. In the
1960s, the museum’s status as the Republic of China’s na-
tional museum meant that it served as a principal platform
for exhibitions related to the “Chinese Culture Restoration
Movement.” 
The NMH later came to be eclipsed in status not just by the
opening of the NPM, but also by the establishment during
the 1980s and 1990s of a number of other national muse-
ums designed to celebrate Taiwan’s modernisation and as-
pects of the island’s heritage—among them, the National
Museum of Natural History in Taichung and the National
Museum of Prehistory in Taitung. The setting up of these
new museums was part of broader efforts by the KMT
regime to highlight its commitment to Taiwan’s development,
while responding to the Taiwanese cultural awakening that
was gathering pace from the 1970s onwards. For its part, the
NMH remained overwhelmingly China-focused until 1995,
when it began to stage numerous exhibitions on various as-
pects of Taiwanese history, culture, and art. (21) However, its
efforts to expand—largely in order to compete with newer
museums—were frustrated by lack of planning permission.
The priorities of state cultural policy under both the Lee
Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian presidencies clearly lay else-
where.
The NMH has nonetheless continued to present a very
broad range of exhibitions consistent with its “comprehen-
sive” remit—generally at the initiative of the museum’s own
staff, but sometimes clearly informed by the priorities of the
Education Ministry. An example of the latter was a 2007 ex-
hibition on “Treasures of SE Asia” staged in collaboration
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19. Both Wu Mi-cha and Tu Cheng-sheng were quite open about the relationship between
politics and cultural policy in interviews and conversations with the author. (Wu was
interviewed in 2004, 2005, and—more informally—in 2009.) See Vickers, “Rewriting
Museums in Taiwan,” op. cit.
20. See Vickers, ibid.
21. See Vickers, ibid., p. 80.
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The exhibition catalogue featured a preface by Tu Cheng-
sheng, since 2004 the Minister of Education. Despite his
previously professed keenness to see the NPM distanced
from direct political control, in practice Tu continued to ex-
ploit the scope offered by the existing system for using muse-
ums to promote the government’s position on culture and
identity. In his preface, he states that “Promoting New Immi-
grant Culture” was one of his “key policy objectives,” which
was why the NMH “was commissioned to organize a special
exhibition on the theme of Southeast Asian folk artefacts.” (22)
He goes on to emphasise themes regarding Taiwan’s geo-
graphical, historical, and cultural links to Southeast Asia that
were by this time well-rehearsed tropes of DPP discourse:
Taiwan lies at the central axis of the chain of islands
that extends along the rim of continental East Asia.
Since antiquity, there have been extensive contacts
[…] between Taiwan and the countries of Southeast
Asia. […] [There] is now more contact and exchange
between Taiwan and Southeast Asia than ever be-
fore. There has been a steady increase in the number
of people from Southeast Asia coming to Taiwan [...]
This “new immigrant” community is now starting to
produce a second generation: the “New Taiwanese.”
The communities and networks formed by the “new
immigrants” from Southeast Asia can now be found
throughout Taiwan, adding new pieces to Taiwan’s
rich cultural mosaic. (23)
Although the NMH, like many of Taiwan’s other major mu-
seums, has thus occasionally found itself used as a vehicle for
the government’s cultural agenda, this does not apply uni-
formly to all of its exhibitions. For example, another exhibi-
tion the museum helped to organise in 2007 was devoted to
“Koxinga,” or Zheng Chenggong—a mid-seventeenth-cen-
tury half-Chinese, half-Japanese pirate and Ming dynasty
loyalist celebrated as a hero for different reasons by nation-
alist Chinese, Taiwanese of various ideological stripes, and
Japanese. This exhibition was held in Tainan (Zheng’s for-
mer base) in collaboration with the city government as part
of a “Tainan Culture and Tourism Festival.” It also involved
collaboration with the Zheng Chenggong Memorial Hall in
Xiamen (in China’s Fujian Province), as well as with a pri-
vate foundation associated with the Koxinga Shrine in Hi-
roda, Japan—a highly unusual combination of partners given
the fraught relations not only between China and Taiwan,
but also between China and Japan. In his preface to the cat-
alogue for this exhibition, Tainan’s mayor emphasises
Koxinga’s role in “opening up Taiwan” and in forging links
between Japan, China, the Netherlands, and Taiwan. (24)
This collaboration appears to have been made possible by a
studied vagueness in the narrative of Zheng’s career, and a
relatively uncontroversial (for all save aboriginal groups)
focus on his status as local hero, symbol of international col-
laboration (if one overlooks the piracy), and paragon of the
Confucian virtue of loyalty.
The Nat ional  Ta iwan Museum
Among those institutions to have prospered most from the
shift towards a “Taiwan-centric“ orientation in cultural policy
is the island’s oldest museum, the National Taiwan Museum
(NTM). Established in 1909 by the Japanese, the NTM’s
colonial origins did not endear it to the KMT after 1945,
which designated it Taiwan’s “Provincial” Museum—very
much a second-tier status as compared with the NMH (al-
though it shared the latter’s “comprehensive” scope, encom-
passing natural history as well as history, ethnology, and art).
Japanese anthropologists had left the museum an unrivalled
collection of aboriginal artefacts, as well as objects relating
to Qing Dynasty Taiwan. Whereas this collection rendered
it at best peripheral to the China-centred cultural focus of
the Martial Law era, its fortunes changed with the “Taiwani-
sation” of cultural policy, and in the mid-1990s it was sub-
jected to a major restoration. Its reopening in 1998 was fol-
lowed the next year by the abolition of the provincial tier of
government, whereupon it became the “National Taiwan
Museum.” The NTM came under the authority of the
Council for Cultural Affairs (CCA), an agency of the Exec-
utive Yuan created in 1981 to protect Taiwan’s heritage and
promote cultural development. 
A hero for all seasons: 
a recently-erected statue of Koxinga 
(Zheng Chenggong) next to 
the Koxinga Shrine in Tainan. 
© Courtesy of the author
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22. Tu Cheng-sheng, “Preface,” in NMH, Treasures of Southeast Asia: Folk Artefacts of the
Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand and Indonesia, Taipei, NMH, 2007, pp. 4-5.
23. Ibid.
24. NMH / Tainan City Government, Exhibition of Koxinga (Guo Xing Ye: Zu ji wenwu tezhan),
Taipei, NMH, 2007, p. 3.
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As mayor of Taipei during the mid-1990s, Chen Shui-bian
had the park adjacent to the NTM renamed the “228 Peace
Park,” and had a memorial erected there to the victims of
the massacre perpetrated by KMT forces on 28 February
1947. In February 1997, on the 50th anniversary of the 228
incident, a “228 Peace Memorial Museum” was also
opened in the grounds of the park. The 228 incident and
the “White Terror” that followed it were crucial in shaping
a distinctively “Taiwanese” folk memory, and retain an
iconic significance for many in the pro-independence
“Green” camp. Public apologies issued by KMT leaders
during the 1990s, and sympathetic gestures by figures in-
cluding Ma Ying-jeou (Chen’s successor as Taipei Mayor),
have gone some way towards defusing this as a partisan po-
litical issue. In broad terms, DPP cultural policy adhered
closely to Lee Teng-hui’s vision of Taiwan as a “community
of shared fate” (shengming gongtongti), embracing all Tai-
wan “belongers,” including those formerly designated as
“mainlanders.” (25) However, the DPP has remained deter-
mined to preserve memories of the KMT’s oppressive
record (26) as just one instance of the victimhood that it sees
as a major theme of the Taiwan story. (27)
Following Chen Shui-bian’s election to the presidency in
2000, the DPP’s cultural policy accentuated the portrayal of
Taiwan as a diverse, multicultural community of varied his-
torical and ethnic origins. This was a trope that had already
entered official discourse during the Lee Teng-hui era, (28)
but the DPP sought to drive a larger wedge between this
Taiwanese identity and any overarching sense of “Chinese-
ness.” One means of doing this was to popularise a histori-
cal narrative of Taiwanese triumph over externally-induced
adversity. Another was to emphasise the primordially non-
Chinese roots of Taiwanese culture and nationhood in the
form of the island’s “Austronesian” aboriginal heritage. 
Numerous initiatives in cultural policy, especially under the
DPP, have contributed to a heightened recognition of Tai-
wan’s aboriginal heritage, which was largely ignored under
the KMT before the 1990s. As recent research has shown,
there are considerable grounds for claims of a mixed Chi-
nese-aboriginal ancestry for many Taiwanese. (29) However,
Han-aboriginal genealogical mingling, which took place in a
context of Chinese colonisation and encroachment on abo-
riginal land, was by no means the outcome of some harmo-
nious multicultural love-in. While themes of tension and con-
flict between aborigines and Han settlers have featured
prominently in the work of some indigenous artists in the
post-Martial Law era, (30) in museums aborigines have tended
to be treated as anthropological rather than historical sub-
jects—obscuring the complex role of Taiwan’s Han popula-
tion as “oppressors” as well as “oppressed.” (31) DPP admin-
istrations at the local and national level have invested heav-
ily in projects co-opting aboriginal culture and “prehistory”
for the cause of promoting images of Taiwan’s distinctiveness
from China. One example of such a project is Taipei
County’s Shihsanhang Museum, opened in 2003, which
was promoted by the DPP county magistrate (and later
ROC premier) Su Tseng-chang. Here a somewhat thin col-
lection of artefacts is housed in lavish architectural surround-
ings, and padded out with dioramas encouraging visitors (es-
pecially children) to identify with these prehistoric aborig-
ines. Issues of Han-aboriginal conflict do not arise in relation
to the Shihsanhang tribe, who abandoned the site hundreds
of years before any Chinese settlement of Taiwan. However,
the museum exhibition, and the publicity surrounding its
opening, emphasised the probable “Malay-Polynesian” cul-
tural links of the prehistoric inhabitants, and their likely an-
cestral ties to later groups of Pingpu (or “plains”) aborigines,
who feature in the genealogies of many contemporary Tai-
wanese. (32)
Given its comprehensive focus on “Taiwan,” exceptionally
rich aboriginal collection, and Japanese institutional origins,
the NTM has been ideally placed to serve the cause of rais-
ing “Taiwanese” consciousness. It is thus no surprise that
while the NMH was frustrated in its expansion plans
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25. Under President Lee, the Census Registration Law was also revised to record “birth-
place” rather than the place of “ancestral origin” (See Chang, “Constructing the
Motherland,” op. cit., p. 189).
26. As observed by the author on a visit to Tainan during the election campaign of 2004.
27. For example, this discourse of victimhood is very much to the fore in the permanent
exhibition of the National Museum of Taiwan Literature, opened in Tainan in 2007. A nar-
rative of collective triumph in the face of persecution is strongly suggested by headings
to sections of the permanent exhibition such as “Anti-colonisation and Identity,” “Wars
and Trauma,” “Alienation and Transcendence” and “Imprisonment and Emancipation.”
28. For example, this “multiculturalism” was a prominent theme of the Renshi Taiwan
course for junior high schools introduced in 1998, which included among its authors Tu
Cheng-sheng. (See Stephane Corcuff, “History textbooks, identity politics and ethnic
introspection in Taiwan,” in Edward Vickers and Alisa Jones (eds.), History Education and
National Identity in East Asia, New York, Routledge, 2005, pp. 133-169).
29. See Brown, Is Taiwan Chinese?, op. cit.
30. See Stevan Harrell and Lin Yu-shih, “Aesthetics and Politics in Taiwan’s Aboriginal
Contemporary Arts,” unpublished paper delivered at the North American Taiwan Studies
Association Annual Conference, University of California, Santa Cruz, 3 July 2006. For an
indication of the standard treatment of aboriginal culture in contemporary Taiwanese
museums, see the volume published by the Shung Ye Museum to celebrate its 15th
anniversary (the title says it all): Dancing into 15th Years of Shung Ye Museum of
Formosan Aborigines, Taipei, N.W. Lin Foundation for Culture and Education, 2009.
31. See Vickers, “Rewriting Museums in Taiwan,” op. cit.
32. Chang, Yun-ping “The Shihsanhang Museum prepares for grand opening,” Taipei Times,
11 April 2003, p. 4. The scholarly consensus more recently has been that Taiwan’s abo-
rigines are more accurately described as “Austronesian” than Malay-Polynesian, the lat-
ter being only a sub-group of the larger Austronesian cultural/linguistic family whose
origins are traceable to Taiwan.
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throughout the Chen presidency, the NTM—with CCA
backing—managed to secure political endorsement and fund-
ing for a major programme of expansion involving the pur-
chase and renovation of a pre-war bank headquarters oppo-
site the museum’s original edifice. Meanwhile, many tempo-
rary exhibitions have been staged on aspects of Taiwan’s his-
tory, culture, and natural history—some of them involving
CCA-brokered collaborations with overseas museums (see
below). 
A particularly popular feature of museum exhibitions since
the 1990s has been pre-1945 maps of the island, which have
also long been totemic symbols for the “Green” camp in Tai-
wanese politics. (33) A 2007 NTM exhibition, Taiwan in
Maps, included very few maps from the KMT period, re-
flecting a widespread perception of this period as a “carto-
graphic void” on the grounds that maps produced then were
generally of “poor quality.” (34) However, since Martial Law-
era cartographers made a particular point of emphasising
Taiwan’s status as a mere Chinese province, an emphasis on
earlier maps has tended to highlight the island’s links with
regions beyond China. Among other exhibitions during the
period of DPP rule to prominently feature early maps of Tai-
wan was the NPM’s 2003 Ilha Formosa exhibition. The
cover of the catalogue for that exhibition displayed a seven-
teenth-century Dutch map showing Taiwan aligned horizon-
tally along its north-south axis, facing away from the Chinese
mainland and out into the Pacific Ocean. (35)
The Nat ional  Museum o f  Taiwan Histo ry
Many of the maps included in the NTM’s 2007 exhibition
were borrowed from the collection of the NMTH in
Tainan—an institution that might be supposed to owe its ori-
gins to DPP efforts to promote Taiwanese consciousness.
However, the NMTH project can trace its inception to an
exhibition on Taiwan history staged in 1992 by the NTM,
which was visited by President Lee Teng-hui and the then
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33. See NTM, Taiwan in Maps, Taipei, NTM, 2007.
34. Chang Bi-yu, Map-phobia: Three Decades of Cartographic Blankness in Post-war
Taiwan. Unpublished paper delivered at the British Academy / SOAS Conference on
“Taiwan and the Asian Region,” London, 12-13 March 2010.
35. See Tu Cheng-sheng, Ilha Formosa, Taipei, National Palace Museum, 2002. 
The National Taiwan Museum, central Taipei, established 
by the Japanese colonial administration in 1909.
© Courtesy of the author
Governor of Taiwan Province, Lien Chan, although the for-
mal decision to establish the museum was not taken until
1998. (36) The museum project thus grew out of the KMT’s
early steps in the direction of “indigenisation” as it sought to
bolster its democratic legitimacy in the early post-Martial-
Law era, though the “active development” of the museum
site and the design of the permanent exhibition began only
in 2002. Despite this long gestation, as of 2009 the museum
had yet to open its permanent exhibition to the public. The
current director, Lu Li-cheng, insisted that although the
length of the NMTH preparation process has been widely
attributed to the political sensitivity of the project (and con-
sequent wrangling amongst various ideologically-motivated
stakeholders), it was in fact attributable more to financial
problems and to bureaucratic or legal obstacles—for example
relating to the purchase of the museum site. (37) The mu-
seum’s opening was originally scheduled for 2008, but now
seems to have been postponed to 2011 or 2012.
Notwithstanding Director Lu’s insistence on the politically-
neutral nature of the museum, his predecessor, the DPP-af-
filiated Wu Mi-cha, seems to have seen the NMTH very
much as a political venture, and he resigned from his post
when the KMT won the 2008 presidential election. With
the exception of the directorship of the NPM (a ministerial
appointment), the switches of regime from KMT to DPP
and back again have not involved any wholesale changing of
the guard across the museums sector. However, the system
whereby national museums are subjected to departmental
control gives ministers and officials the formal power to dis-
miss or replace museum directors and other staff seen as po-
litically awkward. (38) The committee of advisors to the
NMTH preparatory committee was entirely replaced not
long after the unexpected DPP electoral victory of 2000, re-
flecting the acute political sensitivity of this project and the
high stakes involved for the government in institutionalising
an ideologically congenial vision of Taiwan’s history and
identity. In this context, Lu seems to have been something
of a compromise candidate for the directorship. He had first
been appointed in 2002, before retiring to make way for Wu
Mi-cha in 2006. His adherence to a depoliticised, “scien-
tific” vision of the role of museums in portraying Taiwan’s
history and culture meant that it was possible for the (now
KMT-controlled) CCA to turn to him once again after Wu’s
departure.
Under Wu, who had previously overseen efforts to establish
the National Museum of Taiwan Literature (also in Tainan),
the NMTH in 2007 published a plan for its permanent ex-
hibition. (39) This was to be divided into six main sections: 1)
Taiwan in the world; 2) Early inhabitants; 3) The interac-
tion of different cultures (sixteenth + seventeenth centuries);
4) Chinese immigration to Taiwan; 4) Pluralistic develop-
ment in the regional societies; 5) The Great Transformation
and the New Order; 5) Post-war; 6) Taiwan’s path into the
future. Outlining his vision for the museum in a 2009 arti-
cle, Wu explained that he saw the role of a “national mu-
seum” as, by definition, reflecting a “national point of view”
(guojia lichang), which would involve avoiding undue pan-
dering to sectional or party-political interests, but would re-
flect a consensus on the national past. Recognising that such
a consensus was arguably hard to identify in the highly-
charged political climate of contemporary Taiwan, he al-
luded to the roles played by both the KMT and DPP
regimes in establishing the NMTH, describing it as a “blue-
green” project (lan lü tong chi—“eating blue and green to-
gether”). (40) However, in elaborating his views on what a
“national museum of history” could or should mean in the
Taiwan context, Wu drew pointed comparisons with the
cases of Singapore, Hong Kong, Australia, and America—
noting that these societies, like Taiwan, are not the succes-
sor-states of ancient civilisations, but are the relatively recent
products of colonialism and settlement. (41)
The plan outlined by Wu essentially follows the mainstream
narrative of Taiwan’s history as this has emerged since the
1990s: there is an emphasis on the multicultural heritage of
the island (diverse aboriginal tribes, Hakka and Hoklo ele-
ments amongst Chinese immigrants, and Dutch, Spanish,
and Japanese influences). Stereotypically negative character-
isations of Japanese “colonial” influence, or one-dimensional
celebrations of post-1949 “reunification” with the Chinese
motherland—staples of the old KMT narrative—are notice-
The National Museum of Taiwan Literature, Tainan.
Housed in a former Japanese colonial government
building, this museum arguably institutionalises a
“Taiwan-centric” vision of the island’s past.
© Courtesy of the author
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36. Lien Chan’s grandfather, Lien Heng, was the author of Taiwan tongshi, the first compre-
hensive history of Taiwan in Chinese.
37. Interview with Lu Li-cheng, NMTH, 2010.
38. As noted by Wu Mi-cha himself in his 2008 article, Wu (op. cit.). See note 15 above.
39. NMTH, National Museum of Taiwan History [Introductory brochure], Tainan, NTMH, 2007.
40. Wu, Jianli yi zuo guojia lishi bowuguan, op. cit., p. 286.
41. Ibid.
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ably absent. There is an effort throughout to adopt a “bot-
tom-up” perspective on the island’s development. For exam-
ple, the Japanese period is represented through a focus on
the principal local link between ordinary people and the
colonial authorities—the local Police Station—in the context
of a reconstructed street of shops illustrating how state and
society modernised under Japanese rule. At the same time,
that this exhibition was envisioned very much as an ideolog-
ically-inspired “narrative of unfolding” is reflected in particu-
lar by the inclusion of a final section on “Taiwan’s path into
the future.”
A note  on  museum diplomacy
Museums across the world constantly engage in exchanges of
artefacts and exhibitions. However, for Taiwan such ven-
tures assume particular importance, given its lack of access
to many of the standard forums of international diplomacy.
From its establishment in the early 1980s, the CCA’s remit
has included the promotion overseas of the ROC’s culture,
and the staging of exhibitions abroad has become one of the
main ways in which the ROC state has sought to remind the
world of its existence. Indeed, the CCA maintains offices
overseas, a few of them with their own exhibition halls. (42)
While prior to the 1990s the ROC’s projection of its culture
abroad focused overwhelmingly on the mainstream Chinese
tradition, from the 1990s the scale of cultural diplomacy was
stepped up, and its content broadened to encompass a
greater emphasis on distinctively Taiwanese themes. Under
the DPP from 2000, the balance in exhibitions sent over-
seas shifted further in this direction, although the NPM con-
tinued to showcase its collection of Chinese artefacts in Eu-
rope and North America—thereby maintaining a tacit rivalry
with the Beijing Palace Museum, which was expanding its
own overseas activities. Meanwhile, whereas during the
1980s and 1990s publicly funded museums—particularly the
NPM and NMH—had been quietly expanding their ties
with museums in mainland China, under the DPP, central
government encouragement of or funding for cultural ex-
change with the mainland was notably curtailed. (43)
The provision of funding has been one factor in persuading
museums to stage exhibitions that help to promote the gov-
ernment’s ideological agenda and/or its ties with particular
foreign countries. The records of the NTM for the 1980s
refer to exhibitions relating to small African or Latin Amer-
ican states with which the ROC maintained relations. (44)
More recently, the CCA helped arrange exhibitions at the
NTM on the Franco-Chinese War of the 1880s, and on the
Spanish presence in northern Taiwan during the seven-
teenth century, with funding for these also supplied by the
CCA and its foreign partners (in France and Spain respec-
tively). (45) Since 2008, the CCA has continued to involve
the NTM and other museums in its cultural diplomacy, but
the focus has shifted markedly towards China.
Museums up to 2008—a summary
Since the 1980s, museums under both KMT and DPP
regimes have thus both promoted and reflected a rapid shift
in the public consensus over Taiwan’s identity—away from
unquestioning acceptance of the KMT’s “one-China” or-
thodoxy and towards widespread celebration of the island’s
cultural and historical distinctiveness. Writing in 2006,
Chang identified four key themes in DPP cultural policy:
an emphasis on the economic value of culture (e.g. through
tourism); a related effort to “brand” Taiwan, both raising
the island’s international profile and distancing it from
China; sponsorship for projects aimed at “theorising” Tai-
wan, for example through promoting Taiwan Studies, or
permeating Taiwan-related themes in the school curriculum;
and the deployment of maps to reinforce images of Taiwan
as an Asian nation rather than an exclusively Chinese
province. (46) As noted above, the content of the official vi-
sion of Taiwanese identity centred on themes of multicultur-
alism and a narrative presenting the Taiwanese past as a
tale of triumph over adversity visited upon the local popula-
tion from various external sources, not least China. It has
also been observed that the urge to trace back to an imme-
morial past the origins of contemporary Taiwanese nation-
alism has lent a “somewhat teleological quality” to much re-
cent writing on the island’s political and cultural history, (47)
often reflected in the portrayal of that history in Taiwan’s
museums. (48)
There were broad continuities between the cultural policy of
the DPP post-2000 and that pursued by the KMT under
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42. New York and Paris have hosted particularly active Taipei Cultural Centres.
43. Although the KMT-controlled Taipei municipal government, under Mayor Ma Ying-jeou,
did fund exchanges with the mainland.
44. For a commemorative history of the NTM, issued on the occasion of its centenary, see
NTM, The Story of Collection in a Century, Taipei, NTM, 2009.
45. See for example, NTM, Hermosa: Maritime Taiwan and Spain, Taipei, NTM, 2006—which
names the “directing institutions” (zhidao danwei) as the CCA and the Spanish Ministry
of Culture.
46. Chang, “Constructing the Motherland,” op. cit.
47. Evan N. Dawley, “The Question of Identity in Recent Scholarship on the History of
Taiwan,” China Quarterly, 198, June 2009, pp. 442-452, p. 450.
48. See Vickers, “Rewriting Museums in Taiwan,” op. cit.
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Lee Teng-hui, and the KMT’s electoral platform in 2004
showed little indication of any planned return to a more
China-centred orientation in cultural policy. However, elec-
toral defeat was followed in 2005 by KMT Chairman Lien
Chan’s much-publicised visit to mainland China, signalling
the beginnings of an informal rapprochement between KMT
and CCP. Since then, the continuing rapid growth of
China’s economy, Taiwan’s increasing dependence on trade
with the mainland, and a decisive shift—in China’s favour—
in the cross-Strait military balance have all added to the
temptation or pressure to pursue this rapprochement further.
Meanwhile, the prosperity of China’s urban middle classes
has made them a crucial new potential source of clients for
the tourism industry in Taiwan. How then, following its
2008 election victory, has KMT policy for museums bal-
anced the now openly declared goal of pursuing a rapproche-
ment with China with pressures to uphold the new domestic
consensus on Taiwan’s cultural and historical distinctive-
ness?Museums since  2008
The portrayal  o f  Ta iwan
Under the DPP, attempts were made to temper the associ-
ation of the NPM with China in two principal ways: through
using it to stage Taiwan-themed exhibitions, and through the
scheme of creating a new “Southern Branch” focusing on
“Asian” cultural artefacts. This plan was conceived both as
a dilution of the NPM’s China-centred institutional mission
and as a means of distributing state investment in cultural
projects outside Taipei. With the purchase of the site a fait
accompli by 2008, the new Director of the NPM, Chou
Kung-shin, was effectively compelled to proceed with the
project, whatever she may privately have felt about its mer-
its. (49)
However, shortly after her appointment as Director, Chou
released a booklet setting out her manifesto for the NPM.
Drawing an implicit contrast with the approach of her imme-
diate predecessors, she noted, “The collection is the heart
of the museum…. When we veer away from this clear
course, we encounter many difficulties.” (50) This meant a
reaffirmation of the Chinese-oriented mission of the NPM,
since “this collection of artefacts… of Chinese civilisation is
what makes the Museum unique.” (51) Again implicitly refer-
ring to what she portrayed as ideologically-motivated at-
tempts to divert the museum from its legitimate mission, she
went on:
Determining how best to introduce the public to our
own culture is of utmost importance for our nation.
Because the bonds between this culture and the peo-
ple are strong, and cannot be riven by ideology, what
matters is determining how to use these traditions as
wellsprings for the creation of a new culture. (52)
While the NPM thus seems to be reverting to its original
ideological role as a custodian of Chinese civilisation on Tai-
wan, the NMH is apparently continuing its eclectic focus of
recent years with exhibitions on the history, art, and culture
of Taiwan as well as China and elsewhere. Amongst these
was a mid-2009 exhibition entitled 1949: The Birth of New
Taiwan (1949: Xin Taiwan de dansheng), commemorating
the 60th anniversary of the KMT’s retreat to the island. Di-
rector Huang explained the significance of this anniversary
by pointing out that until 1949, Taiwan had always been on
the periphery of a larger state—it was “always a colony,
colony, colony” (zhimindi, zhimindi, zhimindi)—whereas
after 1949, Taiwan was at the national centre, with its own
Presidential Palace, foreign relations, and sense of auton-
omy (daole 1949 cai you zongtongfu, cai neng gen guowai
bangjiao, you zizhuxin). (53) However, the NMH website
puts a slightly different spin on this exhibition:
Having inherited Chinese traditional culture, the Re-
public of China government and its people consoli-
dated their hold on the country [Taiwan] and strove
hard against constant threats from the Chinese com-
munist régime of the People’s Republic of China. For
the past half-century, the Republic of China has
thrived calmly and peaceably in the western Pacific. (54)
It seems unlikely that the NMH would have represented
1949 in these terms had the DPP been in power in 2009,
given their emphasis on the 1940s as the decade that wit-
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49. In interview, Director Chou was highly critical of alleged mismanagement of the project
prior to 2008, but did not seek to distance herself from the Southern Branch plan as
such. She herself had come in for a great deal of criticism for proposing that the
Southern Branch be transformed into a sort of cultural theme park—with hotels, restau-
rants, and other attractions—moves she argued were necessary to make the project
economically viable.
50. Chou, New Life, New Value: The Brand New National Palace Museum, op. cit., p. 16.
51. ibid.
52. ibid., p. 17.
53. Interview, October 20, 2009.
54. For the museum’s English-language introduction to this exhibition see NMH, 1949: The
Birth of New Taiwan (1949: Xin Taiwan de dansheng). Website:
ht tp: / /www.nmh.gov. tw/en-us/Exhibi t ion/Content .aspx?Para=0%7C22%
7C517&unkey=20, accessed 28 April 2010.
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nessed the 228 massacre and the onset of the KMT’s White
Terror—although the website goes on to point out that: 
Our feelings and memories may change with time,
and have been gradually diversified. Even the histori-
ans (sic.) hold different perspectives on and interpre-
tations of this historic period. This discursive diversity
can itself be seen as a form of progress. (55)
In those museums with a Taiwan-specific remit, the change
in regime appears to have involved some significant develop-
ments, for example in the focus of the NTM’s overseas ac-
tivities. (56) The NMTH has seen its opening delayed, for
reasons that remain unclear. However, its latest brochures
suggest that one consequence of the replacement of Wu Mi-
cha as Director has been the scrapping of the final section
of the permanent exhibition, entitled “Taiwan stepping into
a new age” (qiandan Taiwan de lu). (57) The precise reasons
for this are, once again, unclear—though any discussion of
this “new age” for Taiwan would undoubtedly have involved
addressing head-on the issue of the island’s future relation-
ship with China.
Museums and the  China connection
President Ma Ying-jeou’s policy of liang an songbang (“re-
laxing ties across the straits”) has seen a dramatic warming
of relations with mainland China in many fields. The mu-
seum at the centre of efforts to warm cultural ties with China
has been the NPM. (58) Moreover, it is not just the KMT au-
thorities that see the NPM as a sort of cross-Strait cultural
bridge—even before the 2008 election (possibly in anticipa-
tion of a KMT victory), crews from China’s state-owned
Central Television (CCTV) were filming a documentary on
the museum. (59) This film featured an interview with Chou
Kung-shin (in her then capacity as an academic and former
NPM employee), and was first aired shortly before her visit
to Beijing in February 2009, the first by a serving Director
of the Taipei NPM. (60) Chou’s frequent visits to China over
the previous 30 years, and her familiarity with many key per-
sonnel at the Beijing Palace Museum, appear to have ren-
dered her a congenial interlocutor. On February 14, she met
with her Beijing counterpart, and it was agreed that the two
museums would for the first time collaborate in staging an
exhibition—to be held at the Taipei NPM later in the year.
The following month, the KMT authorities upped the num-
ber of direct flights from the mainland to Taiwan (begun in
2008), increasing the influx of Chinese tour groups.
This collaborative exhibition, Harmony and Integrity: The
Yongzheng Emperor and His Times, opened in autumn
2009, just over six months following the Beijing trip. Accord-
ing to the Director’s preface to the exhibition catalogue, the
choice of theme was already under consideration before her
Beijing visit, and was dictated by the particular expertise of
NPM staff, the fact that they had not previously held an ex-
hibition dedicated to Yongzheng (but had done so for Kangxi
and Qianlong), (61) and the richness of the NPM collection on
this emperor. Chou places considerable emphasis on the na-
ture of the exhibition as a collective endeavour on the part of
NPM staff, for example stating that “By December of 2008,
the object list for the exhibition was tentatively set, but my
colleagues expressed a desire to explore the possibility of the
Beijing Palace Museum loaning certain objects….” (62) She
makes no mention of the obvious political significance of this
collaboration, and seems keen to share the credit (or the
blame) for the initiative as widely as possible.
Director Chou’s preface also highlights the Yongzheng Em-
peror’s reputation as an exemplary ruler—but her remarks on
this score are far less pointed than those of her Beijing coun-
terpart, Zheng Xinmiao:
The Yongzheng Emperor […] was one of the rulers
in Chinese history most concerned about Ilha For-
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55. Ibid. Unfortunately I was not able to view the exhibition for myself, and no exhibition cat-
alogue was available at the time of writing. The perspective adopted by this exhibition
may also to some extent reflect what some have seen as growing nostalgia in recent
years on Taiwan for the “golden age of the developmental state” (Joe Wong, “From
Recovering to Merely Surviving: Positioning Taiwan in the New Global Economy,” unpub-
lished paper delivered at British Academy / SOAS Conference on “Taiwan and the Asian
Region,” London, 12-13 March 2010).
56. The NTM in late 2009 staged a major exhibition on the Pingpuzu, or “Plains
Aborigines”—see NTM, Legacy of the Pingpu Group, Taipei, NTM, 2009. This focused
primarily on the cultural anthropology of these tribes, and featured displays illustrating
the way in which some adopted elements of Han culture during the Qing period. The text
lamented the loss of these distinctive indigenous cultures, while making some reference
to tension or conflict with Han immigrants. However, it did not deal with the immigrant-
indigenous interaction as an instance of settler colonisation (as some recent academic
work has done—see Emma Jinhua Teng, Taiwan’s Imagined Geography, Cambridge
(Mass.), Harvard University Press, 2005).
57. See the 2007 NMTH’s Introductory brochure (op. cit., p. 33), and contrast with NMTH, National
Museum of Taiwan History, Tainan [Introductory brochure], Tainan, NTMH, 2009, p. 30.
58. Chou (New Life, New Value, op. cit., p. 17) reflects contemporary Taiwan discourse on
the economic importance of culture in her manifesto for the NPM, writing (in a section
on establishing a “Cultural and Creative Industries Educational Center”) that “if our
country wants to become a developed nation, we must transform ourselves from an
industrial economy into one with the capacity to produce culture.”
59. CCTV only filmed the outside of the building in the absence of any cooperation from the
then management of the NPM.
60. Interview with Director Chou, NPM.
61. Although an exhibition devoted to Kangxi, again jointly organised with the Beijing Palace
Museum, is planned for 2011.
62. Chou, Kung-shin, “Preface,” in NPM, Harmony and Integrity: The Yongzheng Emperor
and His Times. Taipei, NPM, pp. v-vii, p.v.
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mosa—Taiwan. He personally and repeatedly ex-
horted his officials to make “amicability and sincerity“
the principle for governing Taiwan. By using the clas-
sical phrase “amicability and sincerity,“ he meant that
they should maintain friendly relations and pursue a
common purpose with the inhabitants of the island. (63)
He goes on to declare that
The cultures of East and West should interact. The
inheritors of Chinese culture share the same ances-
tors and hail from common origins, which means they
should be able to interact at an even deeper level. (64)
For Zheng, collaboration with the NPM thus supplies the
opportunity to issue a thinly-disguised appeal to Taiwanese
“compatriots” to awaken to the political implications of their
Chinese ancestry and cultural inheritance. However, the sig-
nificance of the NPM’s collaboration with the Beijing
Palace Museum, in the context of Taiwan’s opening up to
mainland tourism, perhaps lies principally in the shaping of
perceptions of Taiwan amongst Chinese (from the People’s
Republic), rather than in influencing perceptions of China
amongst Taiwanese. There is nothing in the Yongzheng ex-
hibition (or the NPM’s permanent exhibition) that would
remotely challenge any of the standard preconceptions that
Chinese from the Communist mainland harbour regarding
Taiwan’s essential and immemorial “Chineseness.”
While the NPM has attracted much publicity, other muse-
ums have long been engaged in extensive collaboration and
exchange with mainland institutions. The NMH has “sister”
relations with three Chinese museums—in Wuhan, Liaon-
ing, and Henan—and staged exhibitions loaned from China
throughout the period of DPP rule, although an exhibition
on the Silk Road, eight or nine years in preparation, went
ahead only after the return to power of the KMT. The text
for this exhibition adhered closely to the orthodox Chinese
nationalist view of Xinjiang history (from which the DPP
had distanced itself out of sympathy with the plight of Ti-
betan and Uyghur “minorities”). (65) Of the exhibitions
staged by the NMH on the mainland, those with Taiwan-re-
lated themes have related exclusively to fine art, a bias that
Director Huang explained by claiming that mainland mu-
seum-goers “are not interested in Taiwan history.” (66) This
may largely be the case (reflecting an assumption that Tai-
wan has no history), but one thing that certainly has at-
tracted exhibition visitors in China over recent years is “eth-
nic” culture. This possibly helps explain the interest evinced
by the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Museum in Ho-
hhot in borrowing an NTM exhibition devoted to the culture
and customs of Taiwan’s aboriginal tribes, in a deal part-bro-
kered by the ROC’s “Tibet and Mongolia Bureau” (Meng
Zang Weiyuanhui). (67)
The extent to which a China-oriented shift across the muse-
ums sector has been officially mandated became further ap-
parent in early 2010, when it was revealed that Taiwan’s two
major modern art museums had instituted an unannounced
annual “quota” for exhibitions “featuring [mainland] Chi-
nese artists.” (68) This move follows steps taken by Ma Ying-
jeou as early as 2006, when he was Taipei Mayor, to en-
courage exchange between the city’s museums and Chinese
institutions. However, the terms of such exchanges were crit-
icised by one local artist as “colonialist,” since Taiwan’s
openness to Chinese artists was not fully reciprocated by
mainland museums, partly due to limitations on freedom of
expression. Challenged to defend the new policy, Taipei’s
(KMT) Deputy Mayor alluded to the global decline of pre-
viously dominant American cultural “standards” and the rise
of a “Chinese standard,” which, she stated, Taiwanese
should welcome “since we share the same heritage.” Conclusion
One question raised by the shift in cultural diplomacy to-
wards support for exchanges with mainland China, and the
simultaneous opening up to Chinese tour groups, relates to
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63. Zheng Xinmiao, “Preface,” in NPM, ibid., pp. x-xi, p. x. Evidence for Yongzheng’s solici-
tude for Taiwan consists of a map of Taiwan and the Penghu islands (NPM, ibid., pp.
102-3), and two Palace memorials (pp. 104-7), including one of 1725 “reporting the cir-
cumstances of naturalising aborigines in the mountain hinterland.” The latter features
accompanying text explaining the extent of Han settlement and the divisions between
aborigines (“raw,” “cooked” and “in-between”—shengfan, shufan, huafan). The docu-
ment reports numerous instances of cannibalism perpetrated by “shengfan,” and
Yongzheng responds by advising clemency and benevolence in order to win the hearts
of the barbarians. The text tells us, “From this we can see Yongzheng’s cautious
approach to dealing with aboriginal affairs” (youci kejian yongzheng duiyu yuanzhumin
shiwu de shenshen taidu) (p. 107).
64. Ibid., p. xi.
65. NMH, Legends of the Silk Road—Treasures from Xinjiang, Taipei, NMH, 2008. One sec-
tion of this exhibition was entitled “The Amalgamation of Multi-cultural States and
Cultures of the Western Territory,” with the text emphasising the diversity of peoples
active in the “West,” the role of the region as a “bridge” between East and West, and the
influence there “especially [of] Chinese traditional civilization with Confucianism (rujia
wenhua) at its core.” The exhibition catalogue features essays by staff from Xinjiang
museum and the Xinjiang Archaeological Bureau, as well as by scholars at Taiwan’s
Academia Sinica, and reflects standard CCP orthodoxy on the history and culture of
Xinjiang and its relations with China.
66. Interview with Director Huang, NMH.
67. Interview with Mr. Wei, NTM. Ironically, this exhibition is largely derived from one first
staged in Prague in 2005 in the context of DPP efforts to promote awareness in Europe of
Taiwan’s distinctive identity. See Vickers, “Rewriting Museums in Taiwan,” op. cit., p. 81.
68. David Frazier, “Plight at the Museum,” Taipei Times, 17 January 2010, p. 13.
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the potential impact of this on Chinese perceptions of Tai-
wan. Exhibitions loaned to Chinese museums exclude con-
tent that might undermine the narrative of Taiwan’s history
endorsed by Beijing, nor will a visit to Taipei’s NPM chal-
lenge standard mainland preconceptions regarding the is-
land’s “Chinese” culture and identity. But what of the other
sights featured in the new Taiwan tours for Chinese? An un-
systematic browsing of Baidu.com seemed to confirm that
the NPM was the only museum on the itinerary of the stan-
dard eight-day all-island tour offered to mainland groups. (69)
The new wave of tourism from China thus appears to be
doing little to address what Brown terms the “vacuum of ac-
tual social experience of Taiwan” that contributes to the
overwhelming acceptance within China of official narratives
of the island’s past. (70)
Expanded cultural ties with China in fact give a platform (al-
beit a limited one) to mainland institutions to propagandise
in Taiwan, while limiting traffic in the opposite direction to
exhibitions posing no challenge to established views of Tai-
wan. This lack of equality or reciprocity is in one sense in-
evitable, since the open expression of all views on the cross-
Strait relationship, including those of the CCP, is only pos-
sible on the Taiwanese side of the water. However, the new
KMT administration, unlike its allegedly “schizophrenic”
predecessor before 2000, appears more than comfortable
with a disequilibrium in cultural exchanges that favours “Chi-
nese” themes and content. In the related arena of history
curriculum development for schools, the KMT has mean-
while become embroiled in a row over the proportion of the
syllabus devoted to Taiwan’s history as compared with Chi-
nese and world history—with pro-independence groups ac-
cusing the government of rigging appointments to a commit-
tee of academic experts to secure backing for expanding cov-
erage of Chinese history. (71)
The KMT of President Ma thus seem to be hoping that a
Taiwanese population fatigued by years of agitation over
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69. Tongcheng luyou wangdian, Zhengzhou dao Taiwan luyoutuan, luyouxianlu,
http://www.17u.net/lxstemplate/view_line_1141853_31369.html, accessed 28 April
2010. The rest of the itinerary consists of activities such as visits to famous scenic
spots, hot springs, and aboriginal dancing shows.
70. Brown, Is Taiwan Chinese?, op. cit., p. 244.
71. See Vincent Y. Chao, “History Curriculum Plan Sparks School Controversy,” Taipei Times,
29 March 2010, p. 3.
One stop that does feature on the itinerary of Chinese tour parties: the grounds of 
Chiang Kai-shek’s former villa in Shilin, near the NPM. The villa itself is currently under restoration.
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identity issues under both the DPP and Lee Teng-hui ad-
ministrations (at least from the mid-1990s) will return thank-
fully to the comforting familiarity of a Chinese nationalist or-
thodoxy (vintage circa 1975)—at least in the realm of cul-
ture. Hence the attempts to brand the DPP’s cultural pro-
gramme as a “politicised” aberration, to be quietly forgotten
as Taiwan’s museums return to the straight and narrow path
of “science” and professionalism. However, the very fact
that advocates of the new “Chinese” orientation in cultural
and museums policy appear compelled to ground their argu-
ments on appeals to scientific rigour and sober professional-
ism speaks volumes about the changes in the cultural scene
under the Lee and Chen regimes. Thirty years ago, the kind
of Chinese nationalist comments made by the director of
Beijing’s Palace Museum in his preface to the Yongzheng
exhibition could easily have come from a KMT cultural ap-
paratchik. Nowadays, even if KMT politicians still some-
times make sweeping allusions to pan-Chinese cultural (and
even biological) unity, in Taiwan’s major museums such
crude propagandising seems out of place.
The DPP engaged in cultural propagandising of its own—
seeking to push further the movement of Taiwanese “indi-
genisation” (or bentuhua) to which the regime of Lee Teng-
hui had already lent official sponsorship and political re-
spectability. Whether DPP policies amounted to a full-
blown scheme of “de-sinification” (quzhongguohua) is open
to debate. (72) Some pro-independence politicians undoubt-
edly aspired to imposing a simplistically “Green” historical
narrative. A highly centralised cultural bureaucracy, and the
high political stakes attached to identity issues, tempts politi-
cians of whatever stripe to try to use museums as bases for
identity propaganda. However, plural, democratic institu-
tions, media scrutiny, and an increasingly sophisticated pub-
lic discourse over issues of culture and identity complicate
such efforts. Meanwhile, the effect of a quarter century of
democratisation on the museums sector has been to institu-
tionalise, in bricks and mortar, behind glass cases and in
plastic dioramas, rival and sometimes contradictory visions of
Taiwan’s history and destiny. Museums today offer visitors a
far more diverse and thus, taken in the round, a far more bal-
anced and comprehensive picture of the island’s history and
culture than they have ever done in the past.
An open rivalry between different ideologically-driven “nar-
ratives of unfolding” has presented museum professionals
with both threats and opportunities. Political interference
from rival ideological quarters can disturb well-laid plans and
complicate day-to-day administration, and offers opportuni-
ties (at least in the short term) to those inclined to promote
the politically-favoured narrative of the day. However, the
public and media criticism that overly-crude politicisation at-
tracts, and the tendency of political winds to shift direction
in a democracy, create incentives over the longer term for a
further entrenchment of professional standards. Appeals to
“science” and “professionalism” can serve as disingenuous
camouflage for the imposition of an unquestioned orthodoxy,
but they can also serve to delineate an autonomous space
within which rival ideological visions can be tested and de-
bated. Despite the apparent hopes of some within the sec-
tor for a quiet life of scholarly retreat, museums are never
going to be “depoliticised.” However, they have the poten-
tial to serve as an important forum for the ongoing, and in-
evitably politicised, democratic debate over the history, cul-
ture, and identity of Taiwanese society. It is only unfortunate
that expansion of cultural ties with China seems unlikely to
involve any extension of such a debate across the Taiwan
Strait—though it is crucial to the island’s long-term future
that this should happen.•
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Glossary
bentuhua 本土化 Chou Kung-shin 周功鑫 guojia lichang 國家立場
Guoli gugong bowuyuan 
(National Palace Museum, NPM) 國立故宮博物院
Guoli lishi bowuguan 
(National Museum of History, NMH) 國立歷史博物館
Guoli Taiwan bowuguan 
(National Taiwan Museum, NTM) 國立臺灣博物館
Guoli Taiwan lishi bowuguan (National Museum of Taiwan History,
NMTH) 國立臺灣歷史博物館
Henan sheng bowuguan (Henan Provincial Museum) 河南省博物館
Huang Yung-Ch’uan 黃永川 Hu Chia-yu 胡家瑜
liang an songbang 兩岸鬆綁 Lu Li-cheng 呂理政
Meng Zang Weiyuanhui 蒙藏委員會
Neimenggu zizhiqu bowuguan (Museum of the Inner Mongolia
Autonomous Region) 內蒙古自治區博物館
qu zhongguohua 去中國化 shengming gongtongti 生命共同體
Shihsanhang bowuguan 十三行博物館
Taiwan tongshi 台灣通史 Tu Cheng-sheng 杜正勝
wenhua li guo 文化立國 Wei Chen Yu 隗振瑜
Wu Mi-cha 吳密察 xin Taiwan de dansheng 新台灣的誕生
Zheng Xinmiao 鄭欣淼
Zhonghua wenhua fuxing yundong 中華文化復興運動
zonghe 綜合
72. Chang (“Constructing the Motherland”, op. cit.) appears to argue this, and it was a stan-
dard criticism levelled at DPP cultural policy by KMT politicians.
